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“THE ONLY CLEAR LIMITATION
ON IMPROPER DISTRICTING
PRACTICES”: USING THE ONEPERSON, ONE-VOTE PRINCIPLE TO
COMBAT PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013 and 2015, the North Carolina General Assembly, controlled
by a Republican supermajority, passed local bills restructuring Wake
County’s Board of Education and Board of County Commissioners,
respectively. These bills were passed over the loud objection of the
majority of the Wake County delegation and, indeed, the vast majority
of the county’s voters. Wake County, home to the capital city of Raleigh
and part of the state’s Research Triangle Park, has long been a
progressive bastion in the state, with Democratic registration
significantly outnumbering Republican registration in the county, and
Democratic candidates regularly outperforming Republican
candidates. With carefully manipulated district lines, those local bills
would have ensured Republican control of both boards, despite the
strong Democratic leaning in the county.
Critically, in such a heavily Democratic county, the only way that
the General Assembly could achieve such a drastic partisan skew was
to overpopulate the Democratic-leaning districts and underpopulate
the Republican-leaning districts, right up to what the legislature treated
as a ten percent total deviation safe harbor. But the Supreme Court’s
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“One-Person, One-Vote” (“OPOV”) jurisprudence makes clear that
the equal weighting of citizens’ votes is vital to the functioning of our
democracy. As Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence to the Supreme
Court’s summary affirmance in Cox v. Larios,1 “the equal-population
principle remains the only clear limitation on improper districting
practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.” 2
In the fifty or so years in which federal courts have been willing to
meaningfully review legislatively-enacted redistricting plans, two raceneutral approaches have emerged to define and explain why plans
might be unconstitutionally unfair. The first is the equal population
approach under the Equal Protection Clause,3 and the second is the
partisan-gerrymandered case, which belief prohibits districting systems
that are rigged to ensure that one political party remains in power
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.4 One of those—the equal
population approach—has resulted in more success and a much more
thorough jurisprudence. Judges have latched onto the idea that every
voter should be able to cast a vote that is weighted the same as every
other in a jurisdiction. As scholars have noted, though, “[o]ne person,
one vote’s individualistic rhetoric may have come to obscure its original
purposes of combating entrenchment and safeguarding majority rule.”5
But these two approaches are not unrelated. One recent case brought
as an equal population challenge could significantly develop the
jurisprudence of partisan gerrymandering cases.
In a country marked by increasing political polarization, such
overstepping as seen in the Wake County, North Carolina, case is likely
to be repeated across the country. Voting rights litigants achieved an
important victory in 2016 when the Fourth Circuit ruled in consolidated
challenges to those two local bills restructuring those county boards—
Wright v. North Carolina6 and Raleigh-Wake Citizens Association v.
Wake County Board of Elections7—that the new redistricting plans
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal population guarantee.
This Article examines the interplay between OPOV litigation and

1. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
2. Id. at 949–50.
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). 975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D.N.C. 2014).
4. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314–15 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).
5. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of
Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 544 n.17 (2004).
6. 975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D.N.C. 2014).
7. 827 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2016).
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partisan gerrymandering cases using the Wake County case as the
vehicle for understanding the relationship between the two legal
approaches. The Article examines the genesis of the Wake County
challenges, focusing on how the litigants successfully gathered evidence
to demonstrate that illegitimate partisan considerations drove the
population deviations. The Article concludes by positing how, even as
partisan gerrymandering cases seem to finally be bearing fruit, the
OPOV principle still provides the single most important “limitation on
improper districting practices” and litigation under that theory should
be pursued. This approach will create a legal atmosphere where
partisan gerrymandering claims are more likely to succeed.
I. BACKGROUND JURISPRUDENCE
Before embarking on this case study, it is important to trace the
jurisprudential development of two legal theories significant to this
case: the one-person, one-vote guarantee and unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering.
A. Development of the One Person, One Vote Principle
The involvement of the federal judiciary in ensuring that electoral
districts are evenly populated, and thus all voters across a jurisdiction
cast an evenly-weighted vote, is relatively recent. When it came to
apportionment and redistricting, the Supreme Court had long been
wary of wading into difficult questions relating to political
representation, and Justice Felix Frankfurter once famously cautioned,
“[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket.”8
That all changed, though, in 1962, when the Court authorized
federal courts to begin entering the “political thicket” in Baker v. Carr.9
In Baker, voters in Tennessee challenged the state’s 1901 law that
apportioned the members of the General Assembly among the state’s
ninety-five counties, where each county was apportioned at least one
representative and one senator.10 Plaintiffs alleged that the uneven
divvying created a “debasement of their votes” in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 Because
courts had not previously required jurisdictions to adjust district lines
after a federal census or other population enumeration, by the 1960s,
8.
9.
10.
11.

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 188–89.
Id.
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many state legislatures were starkly malapportioned, and Tennessee
was no exception. In his concurrence in Baker, Justice Douglas noted
that “a single vote in Moore County, Tennessee, is worth [nineteen]
votes in Hamilton County, that one vote in Stewart or in Chester
County is worth nearly eight times a single vote in Shelby or Knox
County.”12 The Supreme Court in Baker held that the political question
doctrine does not foreclose review of redistricting cases simply because
political rights are affected.13
With courts now authorized to review constitutional challenges to
reapportionment plans, the Supreme Court over the next two years
articulated when such plans could run afoul of the Constitution, leading
to the creation of the OPOV rule. In Gray v. Sanders,14 the Court noted:
How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting
power of another person in a statewide election merely because he
lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county?
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be
chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have
an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their sex, wherever
their occupation, whatever their income, and whatever their home
may be in that geographic unit. This is required by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15

It boiled down to this: “[t]he conception of political equality . . . can
only mean one thing—one person, one vote.”16 The next year, in
Reynolds v. Sims,17 striking down Alabama state legislative districts as
unconstitutionally malapportioned, the Court explained that
“[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres,”18 so Alabama’s
desire to assign one senator to each county and to ensure that every
county had at least one state representative was not justifiable, and
instead only enshrined geographical and regional favoritism.19 The
Court further fleshed out the harm such efforts cause:

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 209.
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 381.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 543–44, 563.
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If a [s]tate should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of
the [s]tate should be given two times, or five times, or ten times the
weight of votes of citizens in another part of the [s]tate, it could
hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the
disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.20

Thus, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional harm that can follow if
anything other than population is used as the basis of apportionment
of electoral districts. Avery v. Midland County21 then extended this rule
to local redistricting.22
But how can a jurisdiction redistrict to achieve this desired OPOV
result? The Court has emphasized that while “[m]athematical
exactness” in population amongst electoral districts is not a workable
standard for state and local government redistricting, governments
must nonetheless “make an honest and good faith effort to construct
districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”23 The rule
that has emerged is that where redistricting plans have a maximum or
overall population deviation over ten percent, that deviation will create
a prima facie case of discrimination and thus must be justified by the
state.24 Under Roman v. Sincock,25 plans that have overall deviations
under ten percent will not be immune from attack, but a plaintiff cannot
rely on the deviation percentage alone to establish a constitutional
harm and must provide further evidence to make his case.26
Importantly, the Court then explained that “minor deviations” in
redistricting plans are only acceptable insofar as they are “free from
any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.”27 Relevant here, the
Fourth Circuit gave that Roman rule some depth, explaining that in
order to survive summary judgment plaintiffs must produce “credible
evidence to establish that the apportionment plan at issue . . . was the
product of bad faith, arbitrariness, or invidious discrimination.”28

20. Id. at 562.
21. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
22. Id. at 485.
23. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577.
24. Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983).
25. 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
26. See id. at 710 (noting the equal population “problem does not lend itself to any such
uniform formula, and it is neither practicable nor desirable to establish rigid mathematical
standards for evaluating the constitutional validity” of allegedly malapportioned plans).
27. Id.
28. Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1222 (4th Cir. 1996).
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B. Development (or a Lack) of a Justiciable Standard for Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims
Davis v. Bandemer29 was one of the first challenges to a
reapportionment plan that arrived at the Supreme Court solely on the
claims that it was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. The
challengers in Bandemer alleged that the state legislative districts for
the Indiana legislature had the intent and effect of securing Republican
control of the legislature, to the detriment of Democratic voters, even
though the state was considered a swing state and, indeed, Democratic
candidates had receive majority of votes cast in both chambers in the
first election held under the challenged plan.30 A three-judge panel in
the district court found that the redistricting plans did, in fact,
constitute unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders.31 The Court’s
consideration of the case produced a splintered set of opinions, but six
justices held that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable.32
Beyond that, there was little agreement other than the fact that the
district court in Bandemer got it wrong, largely because the Court
concluded that because the challenged plan did not produce
proportional representation for the political parties, challengers had
failed their burden in establishing discriminatory intent.33 A plurality
did agree that a partisan gerrymander violates the Equal Protection
Clause only on a showing of “both intentional discrimination against
an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on
that group.”34 Justice Powell proposed a totality of circumstances
approach, arguing that courts should look to a number of factors in
analyzing partisan gerrymander, including “the legislative procedures
by which the challenged redistricting was accomplished and the intent
behind the redistricting; the shapes of the districts and their conformity
with political subdivision boundaries; and ‘evidence concerning
population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.’”35
The Court declined this standard, though, worrying that it would
“invite[] judicial interference in legislative districting whenever a
political party suffers at the polls.”36

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Id. at 115.
Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
See Davis, 478 U.S. at 143.
See id. at 129–31.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 138 (quoting id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Id. at 142.
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Significantly, though, in concluding that partisan gerrymandering is
justiciable, the Court spent a substantial amount of time connecting the
question before its OPOV jurisprudence. The Court noted that, “in
formulating the one person, one vote formula, [it] characterized the
question posed by election districts of different sizes as an issue of fair
representation,” and that if fair representation was central to the
Reynolds Court’s finding that OPOV cases were justiciable, the same
conclusion is warranted in the political gerrymandering realm.37 Thus,
while the Court in Bandemer did not provide any meaningful relief to
the specific litigants before it, it left the door open for future attack on
partisan gerrymandering and linked the ultimate inquiry—fairness—to
the Court’s concerns in the OPOV context.
After Bandemer, litigants struggled to develop a manageable
standard to offer to the Court for analyzing a partisan gerrymandering
case, and defendants continued to appeal to the Court’s continued
division on whether such cases were justiciable at all. These tensions
again came to a head again in Vieth v. Jubelirer.38 In reviewing a partisan
gerrymandering challenge to Pennsylvania’s congressional districts, the
Court again was badly splintered. A plurality of the court, in voting to
dismiss the case, agreed that partisan gerrymandering was nonjusticiable and thus would have overruled Bandemer,39 but Justice
Kennedy declined to join the plurarity opinion, instead writing
separately to concur and affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
case.40 Instead, he continued to assert that political gerrymandering
claims were justiciable notwithstanding the Court’s inability to decide
on a proper standard, yet, for judging those claims.41 Like the plurality
and the court below, Justice Kennedy rejected “the fairness principle
appellants propose . . . that a majority of voters in the Commonwealth
should be able to elect a majority of the Commonwealth’s
congressional delegation.”42 Instead, in pointing future litigants in a
direction that would someday produce a manageable standard, he
noted that “[a] determination that a gerrymander violates the law must
rest . . . on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally
permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a manner

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 123–24.
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Id. at 281.
Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
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unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.”43 Finally, Justice
Kennedy again reiterated the significance of the equal population
jurisprudence to his belief that partisan gerrymandering was
justiciable.44 Further analogizing the OPOV jurisprudence, Kennedy
noted that the Court in Baker recognized the justiciability of
malapportionment cases before the Court actually articulated a
specific standard in Reynolds.45 Thus, opponents of partisan
gerrymandering, while making no progress, lived to fight another day.
The Court’s most recent pronouncement on partisan
gerrymandering came from a complex case out of Texas following the
state’s mid-decade redistricting—League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. Perry (“LULAC”).46 There, a federal court had redrawn the state’s
congressional districts after the 2000 census, when the legislature,
under split-partisan control could not agree on a plan.47 However,
Republicans took control of the legislature in 2002, and in 2003, redrew
the state’s congressional districts to give Republicans a strong majority
in the delegation.48 Because population deviations between
congressional districts are generally required to be as close to zero as
possible,49 the mid-decade redistricting plan did not create any
opportunity to challenge the deviations on OPOV grounds. That did
not, however, keep creative litigants from arguing that the redistricting
process still violated the equal population guarantee.50
The Court this time did not even bother revisiting the justiciability
question, but did “examine whether appellants’ claims offer the Court
a manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining whether a
partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution.”51 It concluded they
did not.52
Appellants in LULAC offered two distinct theories of partisan
gerrymandering. The first was a “sole motivation” standard, arguing

43. Id. at 307.
44. See id. at 310 (“Our willingness to enter the political thicket of the apportionment
process with respect to one-person, one-vote claims makes it particularly difficult to justify a
categorical refusal to entertain claims against this other type of gerrymandering.”).
45. Id.
46. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
47. Id. at 411 (2006).
48. Id. at 412.
49. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).
50. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 413 (presenting the court with two different theories on why
mid-decade redistricting with decennial census data was problematic).
51. Id. at 414.
52. Id. at 417.
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that engaging in “mid-decennial redistricting, when solely motivated by
partisan objectives, violates equal protection and the First
Amendment because it serves no legitimate public purpose and
burdens one group because of its political opinions and
affiliation.”53 Appellants focused on motivation, particularly with middecade redistricting, because it would obviate the need to deal with the
messy proposition of measuring the discriminatory effects of partisan
gerrymandering.54 Ultimately though, the Court concluded that while
the legislature decided to redistrict “with the sole purpose of achieving
a Republican congressional majority,” such partisan goals did not
“guide every line it drew,” because some districts had lines informed by
“mundane and local interests.”55
More importantly here, the second standard focused on OPOV
grounds. Specifically, appellants argued that because the census data
would be further outdated and inaccurate mid-decade than it was when
first used for decennial redistricting, the decision to redistrict middecade was a strong indicator that bad faith motivated the process.56
Therefore, the practice of mid-decade redistricting meant that the
legislature had not made a good faith effort to achieve equal
population.57 Unfortunately, the Court concluded that “[t]his is a test
that turns not on whether a redistricting furthers equal-population
principles but rather on the justification for redrawing a plan in the first
place. In that respect appellants’ approach merely restates the question
whether it was permissible for the Texas Legislature to redraw the
districting map.”58 Thus, as of 2006, attempts to gain any traction in the
Supreme Court in challenging partisan gerrymandering remain largely
unsuccessful, but such claims are still not categorically barred.
C. The Larios Case – A Successful Challenge to a Plan with Less than
10% Deviation
Because the burden on challengers of plans with less than ten
percent overall deviation requires them to produce additional evidence
besides the deviation to prove a plan is unconstitutional, challenges to
plans with deviations under ten percent have been relatively rare.
However, a case from Georgia in the early 2000s helped to define the
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 416–17.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 420–21.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422 (internal citations omitted).
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types of evidence that challenges can rely upon to invalidate a plan with
a total deviation under ten percent.
In Larios v. Cox,59 Republican voters challenged on OPOV grounds
Georgia’s 2001 and 2002 redistricting plans for the State House and
Senate, respectively.60 Democrats controlled the legislature at the time,
but the 2010 census revealed that areas dominated by Republican
voters, including suburban areas surrounding Atlanta, grew at a much
larger rate than southern Georgia, which was rural and more
Democratic.61 The enacted House and Senate plans each had an overall
deviation of 9.98%.62 In both, the underpopulated districts were
primarily Democratic-leaning, and the overpopulated districts were
primarily Republican-leaning.63 Also in both, most of the
underpopulated districts were either in southern Georgia or within the
urban parts of Atlanta—the more Democratic-leaning regions of the
state.64 In the House plan, fifty percent of all Republican incumbents
were drawn into districts with another incumbent, but only nine percent
of Democratic incumbents.65 In the Senate, the plan paired forty-two
percent of all Republican incumbents, but only six percent of
Democratic incumbents.66
A three-judge panel at the district court level found that both direct
and circumstantial evidence left “no doubt that a deliberate and
systematic policy of favoring rural and inner-city interests at the
expense of suburban areas north, east and west of Atlanta led to a
substantial portion of the 9.98% population deviations in both of the
plans.”67 It found that this systematic approach of over- and underpopulating districts based on the voting patterns in the districts “led to
a significant overall partisan advantage for Democrats in the electoral
maps.”68 The court thus concluded that “[t]he population deviations in
the Georgia House and Senate Plans are not the result of an effort to
further any legitimate, consistently applied state policy.”69
Furthermore, the reasons for the deviations—to allow rural and urban
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
Id. at 1324–25.
Id. at 1322–23.
Id. at 1326–27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1338.
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regions of the state to hold onto legislative influence beyond what their
populations should allow and to protect Democratic incumbents while
undermining Republican incumbents—did not withstand Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny.70
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the
ruling.71 Of course, a summary affirmance has limited precedential
value, so “should not be understood as breaking new ground but as
applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts
involved.”72 However, the summary affirmance was still significant, as
explicated by the concurrences filed with the order. Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Breyer joined in concurring, wrote that the district
court’s findings disclosed two reasons for the unconstitutional
population deviations in the enacted plans—the favoring of rural and
urban over suburban interests, and an “intentional effort to allow
incumbent Democrats to maintain or increase their delegation,
primarily by systematically underpopulating the districts held by
incumbent Democrats, by overpopulating those of Republicans, and by
deliberately pairing numerous Republican incumbents against one
another.”73 Even more significantly, Justice Stevens explained:
In challenging the District Court’s judgment, appellant invites us to
weaken the one-person, one-vote standard by creating a safe harbor
for population deviations of less than 10 percent, within which
districting decisions could be made for any reason whatsoever. The
Court properly rejects that invitation. After [Vieth v. Jubelirer], the
equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on
improper district practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its
strength.74

Ironically, the concurrence noted that had the Court adopted a
standard for partisan gerrymandering in Vieth, what happened in
Georgia would have surely have satisfied any proposed standard.75
Significantly, at least in Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer’s minds,
OPOV claims and partisan gerrymandering claims are not unrelated—
both can present opportunities to restrain the toxic effect of rank
partisanship in redistricting. Even where the partisan gerrymandering
jurisprudence has not yet developed to the point where plans can be
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
Cox, 542 U.S. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1329).
Id. at 949–50 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 950.
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invalidated under that theory, the well-established OPOV rule can fill
the gap. Larios thus created instructive guidance for the case examined
in this Article.
Of course, Larios was not the first or only case invalidating a
redistricting plan with less than ten percent overall deviation. In Hulme
v. Madison County,76 a district court found that a districting scheme for
a county board of commissioners, with a population deviation of just
9.3%, violated the Equal Protection Clause.77 The court found the
deviations were arbitrary and discriminatory because the main cause
of the deviations was the intent to “create districts that would not
simply disadvantage Republican members of the Board, but
‘cannibalize’ their districts to the greatest extent possible.”78 The
chairman of the county board provided evidence of such discriminatory
intent when he infamously explained to an opponent of the plan: “We
are going to shove it [the map] up your f ass and you are going to like
it, and I’ll f any Republican I can.”79 Few litigants enjoy such frank
admissions from proponents of challenged redistricting plans.
After Larios, a three-judge panel in Texas found a discriminatory
pattern in challenged districts with population deviations falling below
even five percent. The court in Perez v. Perry80 applied a preliminary
injunction standard as the basis for drawing an interim, court-ordered
plan for the State House where the enacted plan employed a scheme
of overpopulating and underpopulating districts based on the partisan
preferences of the voters in the district.81 The federal court noted that:
[E]nacted HD 41—the only district in Hidalgo County that has a
realistic chance of electing a Republican—is substantially
underpopulated (by 4.41% from the ideal district size), but the rest
of the districts in the county are substantially overpopulated
(2.83%, on average). This apparently systematic overpopulation of
Democrat districts and underpopulation of the one possible
Republican district presents serious concerns under Larios v. Cox . .
. . Thus, the plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits on
their one-person, one-vote claims with respect to HD 41.82

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

188 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Ill. 2001).
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id.
No. 5:11-cv-360, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190609 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2012).
Id. at *53–*54.
Id. at *55–*56 (internal citations omitted).
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Thus, even with what might arguably described as minimal
population deviations, the Texas federal court invalidated districts for
being constitutionally malapportioned.
III. BACKGROUND TO THE WRIGHT/RWCA CASES
In 2010, Republicans took control of the North Carolina General
Assembly for the first time in over one hundred years.83 When they
redistricted the state legislative seats the next year, they created a
supermajority for themselves that has persisted through the decade.84
For decades before Republicans took control of the legislature, the
standard practice for using local bills to pass legislation relevant only
to a small number of counties in the state was that such bills were
usually only pursued at the request of local elected bodies and with the
unanimous support of the local legislative delegation.85 Thus, if City X
wanted to restructure its municipal elections, it might be faster, if the
request were noncontroversial, to ask the legislature to enact a local
bill to achieve that end result more quickly. While of course there are
always exceptions to the rule, this represented the long-standing
practice of the legislature. After the Republican legislature had secured
its own future political success, though, it turned to tinkering with how
members of county government were elected, and one of the first of
such efforts was directed at the Wake County Board of Elections.
A. Wake County Politics and the 2013 Legislative Process
Wake County is home to North Carolina’s capital city, Raleigh, and
hosts, with neighboring counties, North Carolina’s Research Triangle
Park, a strong attractor of business and talent in the region. The county
has grown tremendously over the last decade. Indeed, concomitant with
that growth, the student population in Wake County Public School
System grew 46.68% from 2000 to 2010, from 98,772 to 143,289

83. Kim Severson, G.O.P.’s Full Control in Long-Moderate North Carolina May Leave
Lasting Stamp, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/us/politics/gopto-take-control-in-long-moderate-north-carolina.html.
84. Dan Boylan, Republicans Headed Toward Keeping Veto-proof Majorities, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/
article113483393.html.
85. See, e.g., UNC CHAPEL HILL SCHOOL OF GOV’T, THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL
ASSEMBLY: OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE, LEGISLATION AND PROCESS OF NORTH
CAROLINA’S LEGISLATURE 9 https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/cours
e_materials/General %20Assembly%20Handout%20-%20Master_0.pdf (describing usual
method of enacting local bills).
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students.86 This growth resulted in fairly significant school
overcrowding, and this problem was addressed by introducing yearround schools, increasing the county’s magnet school program, and
continuing the county’s socioeconomic diversity busing program.87 The
latter, in particular, caused policy debate in the county and on the ninemember school board.
Prior to 2013, the nine members of the school board were elected,
via non-partisan elections, from single member districts. For much of
the 2000s, progressives controlled the non-partisan board.88 The
decision to adopt a socioeconomic diversity assignment policy in 2000
was supported by both Democrat and Republican school board
members. But in 2009, partisan debates over the merits of the county’s
socioeconomic diversity policy came to a head when a slate of
Republican candidates overwhelmingly swept four of the nine school
board seats up for election, and with the seats already held by
Republicans, took control of the Board.89 The new Republican majority
took immediate steps to replace the socioeconomic diversity
assignment plan with a neighborhood student assignment policy.
Huge public outcry ensued. The State Conference of the NAACP
and parents of Wake County students filed a complaint under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act, arguing that neighborhood schools would result
in highly segregated schools.90 Community organizers began work on
ensuring that this change in approach would be central in voters’ mind
when they voted in the 2011 school board elections.91 And in that
election, registered Democrats won four of the five seats on the ballot
in 2011, with an unaffiliated but progressive candidate winning the fifth
seat.92 The results of this election were seen as a definitive rejection of
conservative education policies and neighborhood school assignment
plans.93
86. See Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections (RCWA I), 166 F.
Supp. 3d 553, 564 (E.D.N.C. 2016).
87. Transcript of Testimony of School Board Member Bill Fletcher, Dec. 16, 2015, at 85:1886:23 (all trial transcripts on file with author).
88. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 564.
89. Karen McMahan, Democrats Mobilize to Win Back Majority on Wake School Board,
CAROLINA J. (July 28, 2011), https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/democrats-mobilizeto-win-back-majority-on-wake-school-board/.
90. Sloane Heffernan, NAACP files complaint against Wake County schools, WRAL.COM
(Sept. 25, 2010) http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/8348916/.
91. Transcript of Testimony of Rev. Earl Johnson, Dec. 16, 2015, at 24:17-25:21, RWCA I,
166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D).
92. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 568.
93. Transcript of Testimony of School Board Member Christine Kushner, Dec. 16, 2015, at
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Significantly, in that two-year period where Republicans controlled
the school board, the board was tasked with redrawing its electoral
districts to even out the population differences between the districts
highlighted by the 2010 census results.94 The board hired a law firm
frequently hired by Republican groups, and the firm drew a plan that
would undoubtedly favor Republicans,95 but maintained the current
method of election, drew compact districts, and achieved an overall
population deviation of just 1.66%.96 Parents and community
organizations were upset with this ploy, but of course, as it turned out,
the subtle favoritism employed was not enough to overcome
community outrage with the changes to the student assignment policy,
and Republicans overwhelmingly lost in the 2011 elections.97 After the
2011 election results, the Wake County Board of County
Commissioners, responsible for allocating funds to the school board
and temporarily controlled by a narrow Republican majority, set as one
of its legislative goals seeking local legislation to ensure that a majority
of the School Board was elected on an at-large basis.98
Senate Bill 325 was filed in the North Carolina General Assembly
on March 13, 2013, by Republican Senator Neal Hunt of Wake
County.99 The billed called for redistricting the school board using
seven numbered single-member districts and two lettered singlemember “super districts” that overlap the seven numbered districts,
splitting Wake County into a doughnut shape with most of Raleigh in
the center.100 Those super districts are displayed below:

104:2-7, RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D).
94. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
95. Transcript of Testimony of Sen. Dan Blue, Dec. 16, 2015, at 51:14-24, RWCA I, 166 F.
Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D).
96. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 567.
97. Id. at 568.
98. Transcript of Testimony of Comm’r James West, Dec. 17, 2015, at 26:3-27:21, RWCA I,
166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D).
99. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 568.
100. Id. at 569.
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The bill created a system in which each Wake County voter would
vote for two school board representatives: one from the numbered
district in which the voter resided, and one from the lettered district in
which the voter resided.101 The plan split thirty-one precincts, whereas
the 2011 plan passed by the Republican school board split only ten
precincts.102 Significantly, the super districts had an overall population
deviation of 9.8%.103 The outer “doughnut” district, comprised
primarily of the more conservative and suburban parts of the county,
was underpopulated by 4.9% and the inner urban district was
overpopulated by 4.9%.104 Additionally, among the seven singlemember districts, the more urban districts primarily within Raleigh
were overpopulated whereas the suburban districts were again
underpopulated.105 Moreover, numerous incumbents who favored the
county’s socioeconomic diversity plan were paired in the proposed
districts, or drawn into heavily Republican-leaning districts.
Reconstituted election results demonstrated that Republican
candidates would win in five of the nine new districts, thus swinging
control from Democrats to Republicans. The bill passed the Senate in
April and the House in June, and was ratified on June 13, 2013.106
As expected, proponents of Senate Bill 325 were not frank about
the reasons motivating the unwanted legislation.107 Proponents alleged
three main goals of the legislation: to give suburban voters a larger
voice in school board governance;108 to allow Wake County voters to
elect two members instead of just one;109 and to better align electoral
districts with student assignment districts. These justifications would
become central part of later litigation.110 Interestingly, though,
Republican supporters of the bill rejected amendments from
Democratic legislators that would have made the super districts true

101. Id. at 568.
102. Id. at 605.
103. Id. at 559.
104. Id. at 571.
105. Id.; see also Transcript of Testimony of Anthony Fairfax, Dec. 16, 2015, at 138:6-21,
RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5-15-CV-156-D).
106. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. at 573.
107. Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections (RCWA II), 827 F.3d 333,
349 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting “the stated reasons for the redistricting as pretextual”).
108. Transcript of Testimony of Sen. Josh Stein, Dec. 17, 2015, at 20:25-21:4, RWCA I, 166
F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D).
109. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. at 572.
110. Id. at 571–72.
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at-large districts, thus allowing voters to vote for three school board
members.111
Senate Bill 325 was wildly unpopular with Wake County residents
and elected officials.112 In a public hearing hosted by the county’s
legislative delegation on March 25, 2013, every member of the public
who addressed the bill spoke against it.113 In April 2013, the school
board adopted a resolution reaffirming its support for the current
election process for its members and detailing why that process should
be retained.114 Comments from the public during legislative committee
hearings were also overwhelmingly in opposition to the bill.115
Grassroots
groups
like
the
Raleigh
Wake
Citizens
Association(“RWCA”) and Concerned Citizens for African-American
Children (“CCAAC”) organized resistance to the bill and attendance
at all legislative hearings.116 Members of these groups and other
community activists sought legal assistance in evaluating the new plan
and devising a legal strategy for opposing it.
B. Filing Wright v. North Carolina
Two months after Senate Bill 325 was ratified, the grassroots groups
and individuals who had organized against the proposed legislation
took action. They filed a lawsuit claiming that the law violated the equal
protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions because it
created an election system that unjustifiably weighted the vote of some
voters in the county much more heavily than others, thus violating the
OPOV principle.
Importantly, the groups marshalling the legal challenge have been
intimately involved in advocating for the county’s socioeconomic
diversity policy.117 For example, Concerned Citizens for AfricanAmerican Children is a community-based organization dedicated to
teaching parents about the policies, procedures, and laws that govern

111. Id. at 572–73.
112. Transcript of Testimony of Rev. Earl Johnson, supra note 91, at 25:22-28:4.
113. Transcript of Testimony of Sch. Bd. Member Christine Kushner, supra note 93, at
107:20-24.
114. Transcript of Testimony of Sch. Bd. Member Bill Fletcher, supra note 87, at 89:14-18.
115. See, e.g., Transcript of House Elections Committee Meeting, May 29, 2013 (on file with
author) (statements of members of the public speaking out against the bill).
116. Transcript of Testimony of Rev. Earl Johnson, Dec. 16, 2015, supra note 91, at 25:2228:4.
117. Complaint at 6, Wright v. North Carolina, 975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (No.
5:13-CV-607).
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the children who attend the Wake County Public School System.118 As
a parent-based organization, CCAAC works to ensure that all children
receive equitable educational opportunities, which lead them to fight
against racially segregated schools and school discipline policies that
disparately impacted children of color.119 Similarly, the Raleigh Wake
Citizens Association is Raleigh’s oldest African-American political
organization and aims to empower minorities in Raleigh and Wake
County.120 Since its beginning, the RWCA’s purpose has been to
protect, encourage, educate, and help the citizens of Raleigh and Wake
County in their civic, economic, social, educational and political
advancement. RWCA members have been active in advocating for high
quality education for all children.121
The theory of this suit was that Senate Bill 325 created a
redistricting scheme similar to the one struck down in Larios.122 That is,
while recognizing that the challenged plan had less than a ten percent
overall deviation, some of the same patterns seen in Larios were also
present here. In Larios, the Democratic plan favored urban and rural
voters over suburban by underpopulating districts in the former
areas—here, the plan favored suburban voters by placing them into
underpopulated districts.123 Likewise, as in Larios, where Republican
incumbents were targeted for defeat by being paired in a district with
another incumbent, incumbents here who were registered Democrats
or otherwise favored progressive policies were either paired or placed
into politically-hostile districts.124 And, like in Larios, the plan was
designed to secure electoral success for a party whose voters were not
numerous enough to warrant extensive electoral success—that is, the
plan illegitimately favored one political party.125
Thus, because the deviations in the Wake school board plan existed
only to further illegitimate redistricting goals, this plan violated the
one-person, one vote guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment just like
the Georgia state legislative redistricting plans did.126 Relying on
118. Id. at 5.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2–3.
123. RWCA II, 827 F.3d 333, 351 (4th Cir. 2016); Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1327–
28 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
124. See Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 265 (4th Cir. 2015); Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d
at 1329.
125. RWCA II, 827 F.3d at 346–47; Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
126. Complaint at 19–20, Wright, 975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (No. 5:13-CV-607).
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guidance derived from Roman and then applied by the Fourth Circuit
in Daly v. Hunt,127 the plaintiffs argued that plans with deviations under
ten percent could be found invalid if the deviations derive from
arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith considerations.128 Applying a
fairly standard Fourteenth Amendment intentional discrimination
analysis, the challengers planned to demonstrate that any alleged
justifications were prextextual or nonsensical, and thus it was the
illegitimate motives, not the allegedly legitimate ones, that drove the
deviations in the enacted plan.129
However, the district court hearing the Wright case rejected
plaintiffs’ framing of the case. In early 2014, the district court dismissed
plaintiffs’ complaint for failing to state a claim. It said, “[t]o claim
impermissible political bias is to claim political gerrymandering. To
claim political gerrymandering is to raise a claim that is nonjusticiable.
Plaintiffs’ attempt to dress a political gerrymandering claim in OPOV
clothing fails to state a claim for which this Court may grant relief.”130
The district court was both wrong and right, at least in a certain
sense—the motivations being attacked were certainly partisan, but the
constitutional injury was different.131 Unequally populated districts
create a harm distinct from a redistricting plan that, as a whole, was
intended to and has the effect of discriminating against voters of a
particular party. Plaintiffs appealed that ruling to the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.
C. The 2015 Legislative Process
Although the decision in Wright was still pending, during the early
part of the 2015 North Carolina General Assembly legislative session,
the legislature did not feel compelled to wait for a ruling from the
circuit court before replicating the same strategies employed in the
Wake County school board case. The Wake County Board of
Commissioners quickly became the next target. While Republicans had
enjoyed narrow control over the county commission when they urged
changes to the Wake County school board, that control was ephemeral.
Democrats in 2014 seized back control of the County Commission, and
127. 93 F.3d 1212 (4th Cir. 1996).
128. Wright, 787 F.3d at 265.
129. Complaint at 19–20, Wright, 975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (No. 5:13-CV-607). The Fourteenth
Amendment intentional discrimination standard was established in Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
130. Wright, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (internal citation omitted).
131. Id. at 545–46.
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in 2015, all members of the County Commission were Democrats, and
two were African-Americans.132
Unlike the school board, the seven members of the county
commission were all elected at-large. And unlike the school board
elections, county commission elections were partisan elections.133 The
swing of control of the Board to Democrats did not go unnoticed by
the Republican-controlled legislature.
On March 4, 2015, Republican Senator Chad Barefoot of Wake and
Franklin Counties introduced Senate Bill 181.134 The local bill imposed
the same electoral structure and districts set to be used for the Wake
County school board on the Board of County Commissioners.135 The
districts were identical, and thus the bill would increase the County
Commission by two seats and favor Republicans in five of the nine
districts.136 The bill was ratified in April of 2015.137
Legislators used some of the same justifications for Senate Bill 181
that they used for Senate Bill 325, although there were some interesting
differences.138 Again, legislators argued that the “doughnut” district
would give suburban voters more voice in local government.139
However, proponents now raised the concern that it was too expensive
for candidates to run countywide, and that moving to districts would
alleviate that.140 Candidates running in the “doughnut” district would
still essentially run countywide because the district spanned the entire
perimeter of the county.141 Proponents also argued that moving from
at-large elections to elections from districts only was necessary to avoid
a lawsuit under the Voting Rights Act.142 Finally, proponents argued
that it would be advantageous to have school board and county
commission districts perfectly align, even though the appeal in Wright
had already been argued and was pending decision.143
Just as with the school board redistricting bill, Wake County voters
132. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 574–75.
133. Id. at 573.
134. Id. at 575.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 573, 575; Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Jowei Chen, Dec. 17, 2015, at 45:21–46:2,
RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D).
137. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553.
138. Id. at 575–79.
139. Id. at 575–76.
140. Id. at 578.
141. Id. at 569.
142. Id. at 578.
143. Id.
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were outraged. Once again, RWCA, CCAC and other grassroots groups
encouraged their members to attend legislative meetings on the bill and
speak out against it.144 A local polling firm conducted a poll which
indicated that the vast majority of Wake County voters were opposed
to the change.145 Representative Rosa Gill led the legislative opposition
to the bill.146 Gill spoke elegantly on the harms created by unnecessarily
packing black voters into districts and by manipulating population
deviations for partisan advantage.147 Just days after Senate Bill 181 was
enacted, many of the same plaintiffs who brought the Wright case filed
another lawsuit challenging Senate Bill 181.148
D. The Fourth Circuit’s Wright Decision
One month after Senate Bill 181 was enacted, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the motion to dismiss in Wright.149 The appeals court noted
that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are disfavored where a complaint sets
forth a novel legal theory, thus rejecting the district court’s ruling.150
The court relied on Roman for the proposition that being within ten
percent overall deviation does not insulate a plan from attack on
OPOV grounds, and found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that
the plan was tainted by arbitrariness or discrimination.151 It explained:
Plaintiffs allege in detail a redistricting that resulted in a maximum
population deviation of nearly ten percent. Plaintiffs describe how
and why that deviation was unjustified, discriminatory and
unconstitutional. They do not allege that the apportionment plan
with a maximum population deviation just barely under ten percent
by itself supports their equal protection claim, but rather they plead
facts indicating that the apportionment had a taint of arbitrariness
or discrimination.152

Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit flatly rejected attempts by the
district court and Appellees to distinguish Larios, which it found to be
144. See, e.g., Transcript, Senate Redistricting Committee Meeting, Mar. 10, 2015 (on file
with author) (statements of members of the public speaking out against the bill).
145. Transcript of Testimony of Tom Jensen, Dec. 16, 2015, at 212:1-24, RWCA I, 166 F.
Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D).
146. See Transcript, House Floor Debate, Apr. 11, 2015, at 8–12 (on file with author) (debate
by Rep. Rosa Gill).
147. Id.
148. See generally Complaint at 1–18, RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (No.
5:15-CV-156).
149. Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2015).
150. Id. at 263.
151. Id. at 264.
152. Id. at 265 (internal quotations omitted).
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“notably” similar to Wright.153 Recognizing the limited precedential
value of the summary affirmance, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless
concluded that the Larios summary affirmance stood for the
proposition that the ten percent rule did not create a safe harbor from
OPOV challenge.154 The Fourth Circuit also noted that the Supreme
Court agreed that discriminatory treatment of incumbents and favoring
of regional areas would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if they
explained the deviations in the challenged plan.155
Finally, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court’s dismissal of
the case on the grounds that it was a nonjusticiable partisan
gerrymander was wrong on two fronts. First, the district court
misapprehended Vieth—because Vieth’s lead opinion was only a
plurality opinion, partisan gerrymandering cases remain justiciable.156
Second, and more significantly, the appeals court explained that an
OPOV case under the Equal Protection Clause was jurisprudentially
distinct from a partisan gerrymandering case, and the Wright plaintiffs
properly pled it as such.157
E. Filing of RWCA and Trial on the Consolidated Cases
When filed on April 9, 2015, RWCA embraced largely the same
theory as Wright.158 The overall deviation for the county commission
plan was the same as it was for the school board plan, hovering just
below that legally-significant ten percent threshold.159 However, in the
county commission case, there was even more pretext for the
justifications used to support that redistricting as compared to the
school board redistricting.160 For example, legislative proponents
argued that Senate Bill 325 created a superior system for electing
school board members because it would allow voters to vote for more
than one member, thus increasing the number of members who were
responsive and accountable to voters.161 But that same logic did not
seem to apply to the county commission. Since all seats were at-large,
voters had seven members who were responsive and accountable to

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 265 (citing Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949–50 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Id. at 267.
Id.
Complaint at 2, RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 5:15-CV-156).
RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 575.
RWCA II, 827 F.3d 333, 349–50 (4th Cir. 2016)
RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 572.
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them, and Senate Bill 181 reduced the number of representatives from
seven to two.162 Opponents of the bills of course noticed the
inconsistency between the two bills during the legislative process.
In addition to raising claims identical to the ones in Wright, the
RWCA plaintiffs also alleged that the one majority black district
created by the plan was, in the context of moving from at-large to
district elections for the County Commission, an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander.163 One of the seven single-member numbered districts
was drawn to be majority black.164 Proponents said that such a district
was necessary for the county commission because of the threat of a
lawsuit and to ensure that black voters could elect their candidates of
choice.165 Of course, that same majority black district existed in the
school board redistricting plan, but school board members had long
been elected from single-member districts, and that racial reason was
not a purported justification for Senate Bill 325.166
The two cases were consolidated under RWCA in October 2015,
and the court set an expedited schedule for discovery and trial because
candidate filing for seats under the new county commission plan
opened in December and closed in mid-January.167 The cases went to
trial on December 16-18, 2015.168
Interestingly, at trial, the only defendant in appearance was the
Wake County Board of Elections—an entity that was deemed the
proper party because it was charged with implementing the
legislatively-enacted plan, but had no involvement in designing or
enacting the constitutionally-flawed plans.169 In Wright, the Fourth
Circuit held that plaintiffs could not sue legislative leaders because they
had no role in implementing the law.170 Neither legislative leaders nor
the state legislators responsible for introduction of the challenged bills
ever intervened. Thus, the Wake County Board of Elections was tasked

162. RWCA II, 827 F.3d at 349.
163. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 620.
164. Id. at 578.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 563, 572, 578 (noting that school board members were elected from singlemember districts, and listing proponent justifications for the school board redistricting plan;
noting that racial reasons were listed as a reason for moving to districts in the county commission).
167. Id. at 562.
168. Id.
169. See Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F. 3d 256, 262 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he county Board
of Elections . . . has the specific duty to enforce the challenged redistricting plan.”).
170. Id. at 261–62.
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with defending a law that it never requested or wanted.171 The Board of
Elections had no direct insight into the reasons motivating the enacted
bill. While it sought to entice state legislators to testify, those legislators
claimed legislative privilege and declined to participate.172 The Board
of Elections nevertheless vigorously cross examined plaintiffs’
witnesses and offered legal arguments that plaintiffs did not satisfy
their legal burden in the OPOV case.173
At trial, plaintiffs called fifteen witnesses—two expert witnesses,
Democratic state legislators, members of the school board and county
commission, and several of the plaintiffs themselves. Importantly,
plaintiffs’ critical expert witness, Dr. Jowei Chen of the University of
Michigan, ran a large number of simulations for Wake County
redistricting maps.174 In those simulations, Dr. Chen was able to hold
constant several traditional redistricting criteria, such as compactness,
equal population and respect for political subdivisions.175 He found that
none of the hundreds of simulations achieved the partisan outcome
achieved by the enacted plan.176 It was only by allowing the deviations
in the simulated plans to rise to nearly ten percent that the legislature
could achieve its skewed political product.177 Dr. Chen thus concluded
that a desire to obtain partisan advantage motivated the deviations in
the enacted plan.178
In February, the district court ruled against plaintiffs on all claims.179
In its decision, the court explicitly discounted all of plaintiffs’ witnesses
as not credible, even those who were providing objective, factual
evidence.180 The court ruled that “[i]n order to prove a prima facie case
in a one person one vote challenge, plaintiffs must at least negate the
most common legitimate reasons that could explain the legislature’s
action.”181 Thus, the court applied rational basis review to the analysis,
noting that “any conceivable legislative purpose is sufficient” to explain
the redistricting plan and plaintiffs “have the burden to negate every
171. Transcript of Defense Opening Statement, Dec. 16, 2015, at 14, RWCA I, 166 F. Supp.
3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 14–15.
174. Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Jowei Chen, supra note 136, at at 46:19–47:1.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553, 560 (E.D.N.C. 2016).
180. See id. at 604–05.
181. Id. at 589.
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conceivable basis which might support it.”182 The district court barely
cited the Wright case, let alone followed its guidance on how a court
should analyze OPOV claims. Plaintiffs promptly filed a notice of
appeal.183
IV. REFINEMENT IN OPOV/PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING LAW
DURING THE WAKE COUNTY LITIGATION
As is often the case in the voting rights world, the applicable
jurisprudence did not remain static during the pendency of litigation in
the Wake County case. Just days before its trial commenced, the
Supreme Court heard oral argument in Harris v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission,184 and the case was decided after the district
court ruled, but before the Fourth Circuit would take the case up a
second time. In Harris, voters challenged Arizona’s state legislative
redistricting plans on OPOV grounds.185 The court unanimously
affirmed the district court’s ruling upholding the plans.186 While
plaintiffs alleged that the 4.07% deviation reflected the Commission’s
attempt to favor the Democratic Party, the court below found that the
deviations reflected the Commission’s efforts to comply with Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act.187 However, the Harris Court reaffirmed the
conclusion that the Wake County litigants had drawn from the Larios
summary affirmance. Accordingly, a plan with less than ten percent
overall deviation was unconstitutional (and thus could be successfully
challenged) if “it is more probable than not that a deviation of less than
ten percent reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment
factors rather than the ‘legitimate considerations’ to which we have
referred in Reynolds and later cases.”188 The Court went on to list those
considerations it deemed legitimate: (1) “traditional districting
principles such as compactness [and] contiguity,” (2) “maintaining the
integrity of political subdivisions,” (3) complying with the Voting
Rights Act,189 and (4) seeking “competitive balance among political
parties.”190

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 598.
Notice of Appeal, RWCA I, No. 5:15-CV-156-D (E.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2016), ECF No. 66.
136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016).
Id. at 1305.
Id.
Id. at 1307–08.
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1306.
Id. (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973)).
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With respect to that last criterion, the Court held in Gaffney v.
Cummings191 that the advantage of one party over another is not
“competivie balance among the political parties.”192 Gaffney involved
redistricting after a decennial census, not mid-decade redistricting.193
The state legislative plans developed in Gaffney had an overall
deviation of 1.81% in the Senate and 7.83% in the House.194 The
redistricting Board responsible for redistricting in Gaffney explained
that they followed a “policy of ‘political fairness,’ which aimed at a
rough scheme of proportional representation of the two major political
parties.”195 Importantly, in Gaffney there was no allegation or evidence
presented that in order to achieve that goal, the Board systematically
under- or over-populated districts controlled by one political party.196
For purposes of the analysis in Harris, the Court assumed, without
deciding, that partisanship is an illegitimate criteria.197 Finally, the
Court also noted that because of the challenge in weighing the
dominance of legitimate redistricting criteria against illegitimate ones,
“attacks on deviations under 10% will succeed only rarely, in unusual
cases.”198
The state of the law in the partisan gerrymandering realm was
moving too. After many years of struggling to develop articulable
standards for courts presented with partisan gerrymandering cases,
litigants, law professors, and social science experts finally started to
coalesce around several possible ways of framing the legal problem,
which manifested in actual cases.199 The timing is likely explained, too,
191. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
192. Id. at 752.
193. Id. at 736.
194. See id. at 737.
195. Id. at 738.
196. See id.
197. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1310 (2016) (noting
that Section 5 was the law when Arizona redistricted in 2010).
198. Id. at 1307.
199. See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting
Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 ELECTION L.J. 331, 331–45 (2015)
(presenting a “redistricting algorithm [that] can be used to generate a benchmark against which
to contrast a plan that has been called into constitutional question, thus laying bare any partisan
advantage that cannot be attributed to legitimate legislative objectives”); Samuel S. H. Wang,
Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV., 1263, 1263
(2016) (proposing “three statistical tests to reliably assess asymmetry in state-level districting
schemes: (1) an unrepresentative distortion in the number of seats won based on expectations
from nationwide district characteristics; (2) a discrepancy in winning vote margins between the
two parties; and (3) the construction of reliable wins for the party in charge of redistricting, as
measured by either the difference between mean and median vote share, or an unusually even
distribution of votes across districts”).
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in terms of increasing technology in the post-2010 redistricting cycle
and an increasing belief on the part of map drawers that because no
court had yet come up with a judicially-manageable standard for
assessing partisan gerrymandering, there were no real checks on
political gerrymanders.200 Such legislators could be more brazen,
thinking that they would never be held accountable.201 Of course, these
cases were not decided before RWCA, but the timing is nonetheless
significant.
Two cases filed before the RWCA decision showed significant
potential for opening avenues of attack under a partisan
gerrymandering theory—one in Wisconsin and one in Maryland. These
cases articulate two very different theories of the case. While it may be
unlikely that both turn out to be correct, there are at least two plausible
standards percolating for later review by the Supreme Court. One
approach, using a Fourteenth Amendment theory, is relevant to
discussion here.
That case, Whitford v. Gill,202 involved a challenge to Wisconsin’s
2011-enacted state legislative districts, and employs an equal
protection-focused “efficiency gap” (“EG”) theory. The Republicancontrolled legislature in Wisconsin redrew the state’s assembly districts,
resulting in 2012 election results where the Republican Party received
48.6% of the two party statewide vote share for assembly candidates
and won 60 of the 99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly.203 Put most
plainly, “[t]he efficiency gap is the difference between the parties’
respective wasted votes in an election, divided by the total number of
votes cast.”204 That is, the proposed standard measures how efficient (or
not) each voter’s vote is. Specifically, “it is the comparative relationship
of one party’s wasted votes to another’s that yields the EG measure,”
not the numbers standing alone, that highlight the constitutional flaw.205
200. See, e.g., Ruth Greenwood, Partisan Gerrymandering in 2016: More Extreme Than Ever
Before, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/sites/default/files/Post%
202016%20Election%20Analysis%20on%20Partisan%20Gerrymandering%20Impact.pdf
(noting “redistricting plans in the post-2010 cycle evidence more extreme partisan
gerrymandering than any other decade in modern American history”); Thomas E. Mann, We
Must Address Gerrymandering, TIME (Oct. 13, 2016), http://time.com/collectionpost/4527291/2016-election-gerrymandering/ (noting that litigators are working on providing the
court with justiciable standards for assessing partisan gerrymanders in the light of the Court’s
failure to identify one yet).
201. See generally sources cited supra note 200.
202. No. 15-cv-421, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160811 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016).
203. Id. at *29–30.
204. Id. at *31.
205. Id. at *168.

RIGGS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

4/14/2017 7:41 PM

THE ONLY CLEAR LIMITATION ON IMPROPER DISTRICTING

51

As might be expected, defendants in Whitford filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the efficiency gap was really just the
“proportional-representation standard rejected by the Supreme Court
in Vieth v. Jubelirer,” restated, and thus foreclosed.206 The court rejected
this argument, explaining that it needed to hear from the experts and
better understand the metric before it could make that conclusion.207
After trial, the court concluded that the metric was not just the
proportional representation standard restated, and, more significantly,
“[t]o say that the Constitution does not require proportional
representation is not to say that highly disproportional representation
may not be evidence of a discriminatory effect.”208 Ultimately, after
hearing all the evidence, the court in Wisconsin concluded that with
“plaintiffs’ proposed measure of asymmetry, the efficiency gap (or
“EG”), the plaintiffs have “show[n] a burden, as measured by a reliable
standard, on [their] representational rights.”209 Defendants only filed a
notice of appeal on February 24, 2017, and thus it will be some time
before the Supreme Court decides whether to hear the case.210
V. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT RULING IN RWCA
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and instructed it to
enter judgment for the plaintiffs on both their state and federal OPOV
claims.211 With respect to the applicable legal standards, the Fourth
Circuit explained that while Harris was decided after the district court
ruling, the district court failed to avail itself of, and indeed ignored, the
Fourth Circuit interpretation of the law as set forth in Wright.212 First,
and perhaps most significantly, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the
district court incorrectly applied “rational-basis review of whether a
rational state policy could explain the redistricting generally,” rather
than the “specific, deviation-focused inquiry” mandated by Wright and
Harris.213 Plaintiffs do not have to negate any conceivable legislative
purpose to support the challenged plan.214 Indeed, it is now clear that
206. Id. at *35.
207. See id. at *36.
208. Id. at *176.
209. Id. at *95 (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006)).
210. Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Whitford, ECF No. 191, No. 15-cv-421.
211. RWCA II, 827 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2016). The Fourth Circuit held that the district
court did not clearly err in rejecting the racial gerrymandering claim, and thus affirmed that
portion of the lower court’s ruling. Id.
212. Id. at 341–42.
213. Id. at 342.
214. Id.
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the Fourth Circuit articulated the proper legal standard in Wright, and
Harris only confirmed that: plaintiffs in an OPOV case with less than
10% deviation must show by a preponderance of evidence that
improper considerations predominate in explaining the deviations. If
they do that, they have mounted a successful challenge.
Second, the Fourth Circuit explained that the district court also
erred legally by ignoring the relevance of Larios, which had been
explained in Wright.215 Instead, the district court placed “heavy
emphasis on Justice Scalia’s Larios dissent—an opinion with no
precedential value.” Even worse, the “district court misapplied the core
principles of Larios.”216 Contrary to the district court’s assertion, the
Fourth Circuit explained that Larios does not require challengers to
show disregard for “all districting principles,” and plaintiffs in the
instant case should not have been required to demonstrate that every
traditional redistricting criteria was disregarded across the plan.217 In
short, the Fourth Circuit affirmed plaintiffs’ theory of the case and that
Larios-style attacks on malapportionment employed for partisan gain
does create equal protection violations.
But the errors were not just legal. The Fourth Circuit incredulously
noted that the district court “discounted every single one of Plaintiffs’
fifteen trial witnesses,” and that such discounting was clear error.218 The
district court erred in discrediting entirely the testimony of legislators
opposed to the challenged laws, even regarding objective facts.219 Most
importantly, the district court clearly erred in rejecting Plaintiffs’ expert
witness Dr. Jowei Chen.220 The Fourth Circuit explained that it was not
that Dr. Chen’s simulations were simply “better plans” or that they
were legally required, but that they allowed plaintiffs to demonstrate
that illegitimate motivations, not legitimate criteria, caused the
deviations.221
The appeals court recognized that plaintiffs showed, via Dr. Chen’s
testimony, that the overall deviation on the plan was caused by an
intent to create Republican advantage in the electoral districts.222
Moreover, following the logic of Roman and Daly, the Fourth Circuit
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 343.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id. at 344–45.
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noted that because so many of the proffered justifications were plainly
pretextual, it was quite easy to conclude that illegitimate goals
motivated the districts and the process as a whole.223 For example, in
considering whether the school board redistricting created better
alignment between electoral districts and student assignment districts,
the appellate court actually looked at the maps in the record, and saw
that the new electoral districts only exacerbated such mis-alignment.224
It thus concluded that such a justification was pretextual.225 The same
result occurred when looking at each of the state’s justifications.226
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that the appropriate
standard not rational basis, but rather one that focused on the
motivation for the overall deviations in the plan, and suggested,
although not so directly, that consideration of the justifications
proffered was relevant more for an understanding of whether the
apportionment process as a whole was tainted by arbitrariness or
discrimination.227 Finally, it noted that even had those justifications not
been pretextual, none of them necessitated having high population
deviations.228
Importantly, the Court of Appeals distinguished Gaffney and
contrasted the legitimate consideration of “competitive balance among
political parties” from what happened here.229 The court noted that the
instant case, which involved a mid-decade redistricting as opposed to
the normal post-census redistricting in Gaffney, was not an example of
a legislature trying to ensure political fairness by creating a
proportionate number of Republican and Democratic districts.230 That
is what the map drawers in Gaffney were trying to do, but “the
challenged redistricting here subverts political fairness and
proportional
representation
and
sublimates
partisan
gamesmanship.”231 The Court of Appeals thus concluded that
challenged redistricting plans violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
that the record supported only that conclusion, and ordered the district
court to enter judgment for plaintiffs.232
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id. at 349.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 349–51.
See id. at 343.
See id. at 350–51.
See id. at 347, 355.
See id.
Id. at 347–48.
Id. at 345, 354.
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Defendant sought en banc review of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling,
which was denied.233 Defendant did not seek certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court, and thus the ruling stands in the Fourth Circuit.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RWCA ON PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING JURISPRUDENCE
It might be easy to dismiss the significance of the case discussed
here—these were only local bills being challenged, and plaintiffs did
not face a defense with a vested interest in defending the challenged
law. Indeed, such questioning may seem reasonable particularly given
the Supreme Court’s dicta in Harris indicating that it would be the rare
case where plaintiffs challenging redistricting plans with an overall
deviation under ten percent succeed.234 However, when understanding
how OPOV challenges operate in a landscape that includes more
hyper-partisan
interactions, and
more
sophisticated
and
technologically-advanced attempts to secure unfair partisan advantage,
this case will have significant ripple effects not only in equipping
litigants challenging malapportioned plans with powerful precedent
but also possibly informing how partisan gerrymandering
jurisprudence develops in the next few years.
Indeed, in this hyper-partisan world, what the Court might think
only rarely occurs (the sort of extreme manipulation of district lines
seen in Larios and RWCA) is likely to become the new norm. Of course,
dictum is not controlling law, and the Supreme Court may be convinced,
if more similar cases are filed and litigated, that, in fact, such cases may
be more than rarely successful if partisan-motivated malapportionment
is a commonly-used tactic in redistricting. Thus, such dicta in Harris
should not deter potential litigants.
And it does not seem to have had that effect. The ruling has already
been helpful to litigants in other cases. In Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State
Board of Elections, a racially gerrymandering case that alleged that
several Virginia House of Delegate districts were drawn predominantly
on the basis of race, one defense asserted was that political
considerations predominated in the drawing of the challenged
districts.235 OneVirginia2021, a non-profit organization in Virginia
233. Order Denying Motion for Rehearing En Banc, RWCA II, 827 F.3d 333, 351 (4th Cir.
2016).
234. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (positing
that “attacks on deviations under 10% will succeed only rarely, in unusual cases”).
235. 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 542 (E.D. Va. 2015).
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organized to promote a “comprehensive effort to remove
gerrymandering from the redistricting process in Virginia,”236
submitted an amicus brief challenging that defense.237 Arguing that
partisan gerrymandering should not be considered an acceptable
defense to racial gerrymandering charges, the amicus pointed the Court
to the RWCA case, urging the court that “in the face of evidence
showing race-based redistricting, the state cannot defend a racial
sorting by claiming that it was instead viewpoint discrimination.”238
Amicus emphasized that this case stood for the proposition that
“partisan gerrymandering and viewpoint discrimination are not
legitimate redistricting criteria.”239 This explicit connection between
OPOV claims and partisan gerrymandering is significant.
Most importantly, however, is the role that future aggressive OPOV
litigation might have in directing the Court to developing a manageable
standard for partisan gerrymandering. As suggested by the spate of
cases now challenging redistricting plans as partisan gerrymanders,240
each employing new and more precise metrics for courts assessing
those claims, many litigants are hopeful that the Supreme Court will
finally be willing to establish the applicable standard and making such
undemocratic efforts subject to judicial review. There is, of course, much
uncertainty surrounding a potential new justice on the high court, and
how the Court’s jurisprudence will change with the change in
membership. However, it is important to remember that Justice
Kennedy has been and likely will continue to be, for at least the near
future, the critical vote in any partisan gerrymandering case.
Justice Kennedy understands the problem with partisan
gerrymanders as being very akin to the problem caused by plans that
have unevenly populated districts—it is a question of fundamental
fairness.241 As such, more litigation relying on the OPOV guarantee
serves two purposes: (1) creating more precedent for the striking down
of discriminatory plans with less than ten percent deviation; (2) fleshing
236. Brief for OneVirginia2021, Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1, Bethune-Hill v.
Va. State Bd. of Elections, (No. 15-680) (Sep. 30, 2016).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 14.
239. Id. at 15.
240. See generally Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160811 (W.D. Wis.
Nov. 21, 2016); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1164 (M.D.N.C. filed
Sept. 22, 2016); Shapiro v. McManus, No. 1:13-cv-3233, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112732 (D. Md.
Aug. 24, 2016); Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1026 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2016).
241. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–07 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the
need for a “fairness principle” in the instant case).

RIGGS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

56

4/14/2017 7:41 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12:3

out the types of expert and circumstantial evidence that can help a
court understand how sophisticating partisan redistricting techniques
can subvert political fairness. That is to say, when courts begin to
understand how analyses like Dr. Chen’s RWCA analysis can provide
strong circumstantial of partisan legislative intent, that creates a legal
landscape in which partisan gerrymandering cases can flourish. These
cases might also serve as a stepping stone for courts to become more
comfortable with restricting improper partisan legislation, because
courts can operate within the safety of the well-established OPOV
framework, where the courts are not being asked to develop new
standards.
That type of precedent can also help litigants hone how they frame
and articulate the harms wrought by political gerrymandering. And,
ultimately, such litigation could very well inform Justice Kennedy’s
decision, someday, to embrace a standard for measuring partisan
gerrymanders. Litigants across the country must continue to rely on
“the only clear limitation on proper districting practices,” and
aggressively bring challenges to plans that use population disparities
for improper partisan goals, in hopes that one day soon, the OPOV
principle will no long be the “only” limitation on anti-democratic
redistricting efforts.

